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Abstract This paper argues that the grammarians Bhat:t:oji Dı¯ks: ita and
Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a did innovate in the realm of grammatical philosophy, without
however admitting or perhaps even knowing it. Their most important inno-
vation is the reinterpretation of the sphot:a. For reasons linked to new
developments in sentence interpretation (sa¯bdabodha), in their hands the
sphot:a became a semantic rather that an ontological entity.
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In an earlier publication (Bronkhorst 2005), I have argued that Bhat:t:oji
Dı¯ks: ita was innovative in the philosophy of grammar. What I have tried to
show there is that Bhat:t:oji introduced a notion of sphot:a which was essentially
different from the sphot:a that had been used by all his predecessors. Before
Bhat:t:oji the sphot:a had been an ontological entity: a word (the pada-sphot:a,
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i.e., the sphot:a which is the word), to take an example, is an existent thing,
different from the sounds of which, we might naively think, it is constituted.
With Bhat:t:oji this changes: the sphot:a is for him a semantic entity, and
therefore primarily a meaning-bearer. An individual sound can therefore be a
sphot:a in the pre-Bhat:t:oji sense (it is an existing entity that is different from
the vibrations that seem to constitute it), but not in Bhat:t:oji’s sense (individual
sounds have no meaning); when Bhat:t:oji speaks of varn: a-sphot:as, he is as a
result referring not to sounds, but to (meaningful) morphemes.
The point of departure of this paper is the conclusion of the earlier one:
Bhat:t:oji did indeed innovate in the field of the philosophy of grammar. The
questions to be addressed at present are: (i) why did he innovate? and (ii) did
he know that he innovated?
With regard to the second question we observe that Bhat:t:oji went out of his
way to show, unsuccessfully, that he had really nothing new to say.1 This by
itself does not of course prove that he did not know that he was innovating, but
if he did he kept it to himself. We will return to this second question below, after
a consideration of the first one. To answer the first question we will have a look
at the intellectual context in which Bhat:t:oji made his innovation.
I mention Bhat:t:oji’s intellectual context, not his social, political or eco-
nomic context. The reason is not that the latter is unimportant. The contrary is
true. However, intellectual traditions are not fully determined by social,
political and economic factors. Intellectual traditions have a momentum of
their own which can, in sufficiently favorable circumstances, largely determine
how they will continue. In the present context it is essential to recall that
certain changes, intellectual changes, can be brought about by unresolved is-
sues within the tradition. The intellectual currents that interest us at present
are currents of rational thought, by which I mean to say that they try to
eliminate contradictions and look for coherence. This implies, among other
things, that they take into account the criticism they are subjected to and that
they are sensitive to different opinions. Social and political factors may
determine whose criticism our thinkers are willing to listen to, and whose
opinions they are willing to consider, if only perhaps to reject them; pandits of
the time of Bhat:t:oji were not keen to listen to criticism that came from
without the Sanskrit tradition, nor were they ready to pay serious attention to
opinions that were current outside their own group. But a great deal of crit-
icism came from within the Sanskrit tradition, which harbored a variety of
points of view. Scholars of this period compared their own positions with
different ones current within the tradition. The differences constituted
an ongoing challenge which new thinkers were free, or even encouraged, to
take up.
1 cf. Bhat:t:oji’s Vaiya¯karan: a-matonmajjana 1a-b and Kaun:d: a Bhat:t:a’s comments thereon (VBhS,
slightly different in VBh): bha¯s:ya¯bdheh: sabdakaustubha uddhr: ta ity uktis tu sabdakaustubhokta¯na¯m
artha¯na¯m a¯dhunikotpreks: itatvanira¯sa¯ya ‘‘‘The S´abdakaustubha is drawn from the ocean of the
Bha¯s:ya’: This is to dispel the notion that the topics recorded in the S´abdakaustubha have been
invented by men of the present day’’ (tr. Joshi 1995, p. 3).
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Some modern scholars may not take the presumed rationality of the tra-
ditions under consideration very seriously, and look upon it as a cover to hide
the fact that no one in these traditions was ready to change his mind even on
minor details. I do not share this extreme skepticism. I even think that those
who hold such views are not likely to reach more than a very limited and
superficial understanding of what was going on in the different s´a¯stras. Purely
intellectual challenges had their role to play, and ambitious thinkers did take
them up. Developments in the philosophy of grammar to which we will turn
below will illustrate this.
Which then was the intellectual challenge that Bhat:t:oji Dı¯ks: ita — as
explained by his nephew Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a — was facing when he created his
philosophy of grammar?2 The answer lies in a development that was already a
thousand years old at his time and had so far largely run its course in two
schools of thought different from grammar. I am referring to the discussions
about the understanding of the sentence that seem to have begun in the
Mı¯ma¯m: sa¯ school of philosophy, had subsequently been taken up by Nya¯ya,
and which came to be known as sa¯bdabodha ‘‘verbal understanding.’’
The philosophical writings of Bhat:t:oji and his nephew Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a must
be seen as the defensive reaction of two grammarians who were not willing to
tolerate the incorrect way the Naiya¯yikas and Mı¯ma¯m: sakas used traditional
grammar. Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a protested against the misuse of Pa¯n: ini’s
grammar and tried to arrive at a way of exhaustively analyzing the meaning of
sentences which is in agreement with the statements of Pa¯n: ini and, of course,
those of his oldest commentators Ka¯tya¯yana and Patan˜jali. In an important
way Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a reasserted the authority of tradition, and of
the Pa¯n: inian grammatical tradition in particular.
The technique of sentence analysis called sa¯bdabodha takes as its point of
departure a clear definition of the meanings of the smallest meaningful ele-
ments of the sentence. There was plenty of disagreement about what precise
meanings these smallest elements conveyed, but everyone agreed that the
sentence expresses more than the sum of the meanings of its constituent
morphemes. Somehow these meanings are structured in the resulting under-
standing of the sentence, so that the sentence meaning goes beyond the
meanings of its constituent parts. Where does this extra meaning come from?
It is in answering this question that Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a could make
good use of the discussions about the sphot:a that had taken place before them,
both inside and outside the grammatical tradition. In these earlier discussions
the idea had been launched that a word is ontologically different from its
‘‘constituent’’ sounds, the sentence from its ‘‘constituent’’ words; these
ontologically different entities were called sphot:a. Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a
Bhat:t:a were less interested in ontological questions, so they represented these
earlier positions in the following modified way: The pada-sphot:a, i.e. the word,
is a different meaning-bearer from the ‘‘constituent’’ varn: a-sphot:as, the
morphemes; and the va¯kya-sphot:a, i.e. the sentence, is a different meaning-
2 For a more detailed presentation of the following, see Bronkhorst (forthcoming).
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bearer from the ‘‘constituent’’ pada-sphot:as, the words. The expressive power
of the word is not, therefore, merely the accumulation of the meanings of its
morphemes; and the meaning of the sentence is not merely the accumulation
of the meanings of its words, but has its own, different meaning. The sphot:a
theory, as revamped by Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a, provided a perfect jus-
tification for the complex and structured meaning, different from the sum of
the meanings of the constituent parts, which these grammarians assigned to
the sentence.3
In order to further elucidate the issues at stake, one can do no better than
cite the relevant passage from Joshi’s Sphot:anirn: aya (1967, pp. 142–144). We
read there:
The Naiya¯yikas uphold that words denote isolated meanings and the
relational meaning is communicated by the ta¯tparya function or
sam: sargamarya¯da¯. According to them, the individual words convey their
own meaning through the primary function (abhidha¯) and the syntacti-
cally unified meaning is conveyed by virtue of the ta¯tparya function
(purport of words).
The Bha¯t:t:a school of the Mı¯ma¯m: sakas maintains that words denote
isolated meanings, and syntactically related meaning is conveyed by the
secondary function (laks:an: a¯).… The Bha¯t:t:a school and the Nya¯ya school
differ from each other in accepting … different mediums through which
the syntactic meaning is conveyed. [But] both the schools admit that the
sentence-meaning is [something] over and above the primary meaning of
words. …
… the va¯kyasakti theory of the grammarians assumes that the entire
sentence is an indivisible unit, and its meaning is also an undivided whole
which has no parts. … For example, when the sentence nı¯lo ghat:ah: is
paraphrased nı¯la¯bhinno ghat:ah: (‘‘A jar non-different from the blue
thing’’), the meaning ‘‘non-different’’ is [as much part] of the sentence-
meaning as … ‘‘jar’’ and ‘‘blue’’.
It is in this way that our grammarians, by using the sphot:a theory, could avoid
postulating functions such as ta¯tparya or laks:an: a¯, and yet arrive at a satis-
factory explanation of the sentence-meaning. The sphot:a theory was thus used
to solve a problem that accompanied sa¯bdabodha. This solution was a
grammarians’ solution, but the problem was common to all who were inter-
ested in this kind of analysis. The Naiya¯yikas and Mı¯ma¯m: sakas had proposed
other solutions to bridge the gap between the meaning of the sentence and the
3 A similar argument could of course be made for the compound (cf. VBhS ed. A¯nA¯s´r p. 42 l. 9–10
[1st ed. p. 37l. 7], ed. ChPS p. 384, ed. KSS p. 304, ed. Pr p. 380, Das, 1990: 140 l. 17–18:
sama¯se…a¯vasyikaiva samuda¯yasya … visis: t: a¯rthe saktih: ), yet there is no such thing as a
sama¯sasphot:a for Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a. See further Biswal 1995: 40 ff.
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meanings of its constituent parts.4 This gap was real according to those other
thinkers and therefore had to be bridged. The grammarians’ solution was
more elegant in that it denied the importance, or even the existence, of this
gap: Since these grammarians considered the sentence to be an expressive unit
by itself, they believed that it would be a mistake to think that a sentence even
expressed the meanings of its constituent words.
Our grammarians were not totally original in postulating the sentence as a
single meaning bearer. Bhartr:hari had said similar things.
5 However, Bhat:t:oji
and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a were no longer interested in ontological issues, so that, in
spite of lip-service to predecessors, their differently conceptualized sphot:as
were meaning bearers. It was convenient for them to know that the gram-
matical tradition had long maintained that sentences are different from their
constituent words, and words different from their constituent morphemes, for
it justified certain steps in their adoption of the sa¯bdabodha procedure into
grammar.
Having seen how and why Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a innovated, we have
to address the question why they denied doing so? Were they incapable of
seeing that a semantic sphot:a is not quite the same as an ontological sphot:a?
Did they lack the historical sense to see that their predecessors were guided by
questions and concerns different from their own? Did they fail to see that their
own semantic concerns had succeeded and replaced the ontological concerns
of those who preceded them?
In a certain sense these questions must no doubt be answered in the affir-
mative. At the same time, answers which base themselves on certain presumed
intellectual shortcomings of the people concerned are not very satisfactory, and
most probably incorrect. What is primarily at stake is not the intellect of one or
two individuals, but the culture of which they were part. Our question must
therefore be reformulated: What in the culture of these two individuals made
them overlook the fact that a semantic sphot:a is not quite the same an onto-
logical sphot:a? What made them fail to see that their own semantic concerns
had succeeded and replaced the ontological concerns of their predecessors?
At this point it is tempting to recall some remarks made by Sheldon Pollock
(1985, p. 515): ‘‘[I]f in certain areas the shastric paradigm did encourage—or
enforce—a certain stasis …, elsewhere Indian cultural history in the classical
and medieval period is crowded with exciting discovery and innovation …
These are not, however, perceived to be such; they are instead viewed,
through the inverting lens of ideology, as renovation and recovery …’’ Is it
possible that Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a believed that their sphot:a somehow
4 See also Kunjunni Raja 1963: 191 ff. The sub-school of Mı¯ma¯m: sa¯ linked to the name of Prab-
ha¯kara denied that a sentence expresses more than the sum of the meanings of its constituent
parts; for this position, known as anvita¯bhidha¯nava¯da, see Kunjunni Raja 1963: 197 ff.; Joshi 1967:
146 ff.
5 Cf. Vkp 2.42: sambandhe sati yat tv anyad a¯dhikyam upaja¯yate/va¯kya¯rtham eva tam: pra¯hur
anekapadasam: srayam// ‘‘Was aber, wenn der Zusammenhang [der Wo¨rter im Satze hergestellt] ist,
an Weiterem hinzukommt, das allein nennen [diese Lehrer] den auf mehreren Wo¨rtern beru-
henden Sinn des Satzes’’ (tr. Rau 2002, p. 52). Cf. Kunjunni Raja, 1963: 224 ff.
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corresponded to an ‘‘original’’ sphot:a? Did they think they had ‘‘recovered’’
something? Did they see themselves as being part of some kind of Renais-
sance? Did they consider their new interpretation of the sphot:a merely a
rephrasing in modern terminology of some older truth of the ancients?6
There are two sides to the questions here asked. On the one hand there can
be no doubt that our authors knew that they were reacting to and participating
in developments that were relatively new. The kind of sentence analysis they
were dealing with had received a new impetus from a school of thought that
was known, also in their time, as ‘‘the new Nya¯ya’’ (Navyanya¯ya). In an
important sense our two authors must have been aware that they were par-
ticipating in new developments which had never taken place before. As a
result renovation and recovery cannot explain all the contributions they made
to the philosophy of language. On the other hand, there is a clear tendency in
their writings to hold on to, and where necessary to recover, the teachings of
tradition.
We do not need to postulate that in the opinion of our authors all problems
had already been solved before their time, so that their sole task was to
recover the earlier solutions. We can safely abandon this idea, and yet accept
their complete reliance on tradition. The traditionalism of our authors rather
implies that they were convinced that the tools and concepts provided by
tradition were adequate, not only for certain tasks, but for all possible tasks in
which they might play a role; this also includes new tasks that may have never
presented themselves before. Pa¯n: ini’s semantic indications were perhaps not
formulated for the purpose of sa¯bdabodha, but they are—i.e., have to be—
more than adequate in this context, too. Therefore the sphot:a as made
known by tradition must also be such as to be useful in this new context.
In the opinion of our two authors, although the tools and concepts
handed down by tradition may not constitute the whole truth, they cer-
tainly are the elements with whose help we may hope to reach it.
The historically oriented reader will object that the sphot:a before Bhat:t:oji
had a different function from the one he assigned to it. It seems likely that
Bhat:t:oji did not so much think in terms of function, but rather in terms of a
transhistorical reality; as a result he did not think historically either. The
sphot:a was a transhistorical concept provided by tradition, so that also new
problems, not yet known to his predecessors, had to be solved with its help. If
this was axiomatic for him, it is not surprising that he forced the concept
somewhat where that was necessary for his purposes. Did Bhat:t:oji know that
he forced the concept? Unfortunately it is not possible to interrogate him on
this subject, but I consider it likely that he would have responded that the
classical sphot:a concept had to be interpreted more widely (and had been
meant by its originators to be interpreted more widely), precisely because
6 This last question is based on the quotation from Jayanta Bhat:t:a’s Nya¯yaman˜jarı¯ (introduction,
verse 8) cited by Pollock, in Matilal’s translation: ‘‘How can we discover any new fact or truth?
One should consider novelty only in rephrasing the older truths of the ancients in modern ter-
minology.’’ (kuto va¯ nu¯tanam: vastu vayam utpreks: itum: ks:ama¯h: /vacovinya¯savaicitryama¯tram atra
vica¯ryata¯m//).
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otherwise it would not solve the new difficulties encountered in connection
with sa¯bdabodha. From his point of view—in which tradition reveals to us
elements of a transhistorical reality, without claim to completeness—this
would make perfect sense.
The traditional thinker and the historically oriented outsider will in this way
interpret the same events differently. Both might agree that Bhat:t:oji and
Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a were caught up in a developmental stream that had begun
some centuries earlier, and in which they could only try to stay afloat. Staying
afloat in an intellectual stream means adapting one’s views so as to keep them
coherent, and reacting to the challenges that present themselves. To the
outsider, such adaptations and reactions may look original or innovative. The
traditional thinker would disagree, for all he tries to do is proceed in such a
manner as to preserve tradition in its full authority. From Bhat:t:oji’s point of
view, the sphot:a he talks about may perhaps not be found in the writings of his
predecessors, yet the interpretation he gives to it must have been the one
intended by the ancient sages, for only thus can the sphot:a play a useful role in
the new developments that were taking place at his time. Bhat:t:oji recovered
the correct interpretation of the sphot:a in order to steer the new developments
of his time in the right direction, i.e., in agreement with ancient tradition. We
do not know for sure whether Bhat:t:oji was aware of the fact that his sphot:a
was different from the one of his predecessors, but if he did, this, I submit, is
how he would explain this difference.
For the outside observer it is important to keep in mind that the current in
which Bhat:t:oji and Kaun: d: a Bhat:t:a found themselves was an intellectual cur-
rent. The existence of this current was, of course, made possible by features of
the surrounding landscape. The influence of the surrounding landscape on
those who find themselves in the midst of the river is, at least in cases like the
one just considered, indirect and of relatively secondary importance. How-
ever, earthquakes may change the surrounding landscape beyond recognition,
and bring it about that existing currents lose much of their volume, change
their course or disappear altogether. This did not happen at the time of
Bhat:t:oji Dı¯ks: ita. It was going to happen, not so very long after him. This
coming earthquake is however beyond the scope of the present paper.7
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